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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
FRANK H. FULLMER, DAVID H.
FULLMER and WILLARD L.
FULLMER, JR., individually, and
as co-partners doing business under
the name and style of FULLMER
BROS., a co-partnership; WILLIAM
L. PEREIRA doing business as WILLIAM L. PEREIRA & ASSOCIATES ; WILLIAM L. PEREIRA &
ASSOCIATES, a corporation; and
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10258

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case concerns the validity of plaintiff's
(hereinafter referred to by name or by "Plaintiff")
three separate services of summons upon defendant
William L. Pereira & Associates, a California corporation (hereinafter referred to by name or by
"Defendant").
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following the hearing on defendant's motion
to quash two of plaintiff's services of summons on
defendant, Third District Judge A. H. Ellett by
Amended Judgment entered on October 26, 1964,
granted defendant's motion and quashed two of
1
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plaintiff's services of summons upon defendant, and
the court on its own motion quashed plaintiffs third
service of summons upon defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Amended Judgment quashing plaintiff's services of summons upon
defendant, and for judgment that defendant was
properly served with summons,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are contained in the Complaint on file herein, the Amended Judgment of the
District Court ordering service of summons quashed,
and the affidavits submitted by the parties to the
District Court, and are parenthetically designated
as such, with reference to page and paragraph.
On December 23, 1959, plaintiff entered into
an Architect's Agreement with defendant William
L. Pereira & Associates, a California corporation,
whereby said defendant agreed to provide architectural, engineering and supervision services to plaintiff in connection with the design and construction
of the Prudential Federal Savings Building in Salt
Lake City. (Complaint, R. 15, Para. H I ) . The relevant provisions of this agreement relating to defendant's duties thereunder are as follows:
"5 The architect's services during construction shall include regular supervision.
Regular supervision shall consist of:
(c) The Architect and Owner agree that
the Architect's full-time supervision is
necessary . . . during the construction period; and that the Architect shall furnish
the services of a qualified superintendent
2
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who will reside in Salt Lake City, Utah
during the construction period." (Emphasis added).
(d) The issuance of monthly estimates of
amounts due the contractor for the portions of work completed to date of certification.
(f) The furnishing of all interpretations,
details or incidental services necessary for
the proper execution of the work, including the selection of colors, textures, and
finishes.
(g) The issuance to the Contractor or to
the Construction Superintendent of any
change orders which substantially alter
the function, quality, appearance or cost
of the finished work. Such change orders
shall have the prior approval of the Owner's authorized representative before they
become effective. Copies of change orders
shall be sent to the office of the Owner at
time of issuance.
(h) The preparation, in collaboration with
the Contractor or Construction Superintendent,
of a set of marked blueprints or
u
as built" drawings which shall show all
basic changes from the original contract
requirements and the locations of covered
sumps, sewer lines, cleanouts, water and
gas mains, and electric service feeders.
The correctness of said drawings and data
shall be attested by both the Contractor
or Construction Superintendent and the
Architect, and a copy of said "as built''
drawing shall be filed With the Owner.
(i) The checking and approval of the
mechanical system by the mechanical engineering designer prior to issuance of the
3
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completion certificate, together with instructions to the custodian as to operation
procedure.
(j) The checking of accounts in connection with the construction phase of the
project in sufficient detail as to enable
him to intellingently certify to their correctness before final payment is made to
the Contractor.
(k) The issuance of a completion certificate when all work called for by the
drawings and specifications has been satisfactorily completed." (R. 77, 78, 79)
On July 19, 1962, plaintiff entered into a construction contract with Fullmer Bros., a co-partnership, whereby said Fullmer Bros, agreed to provide
the labor and materials necessary for the construction and completion of the building in accordance
with the drawings and specificaltions prepared by
defendant. (Complaint R. 17, 18, Para. X). Shortly
thereafter, Fullmer Bros, entered into a subcontract
with Allen Steel Company for the fabrication and
erection of the steel framework of the building.
(Complaint R. 20, Para. XIX).
The project was commenced early in the year
1962, and was scheduled for completion and occupancy on December 1,1963. (Complaint R. 16, Para.
HI). However, due to errors in the design, construction and fabrication of two large horizontal steel
girders forming the main support of the building
and in the fabrication and erection of the structural
steel framework for the building, extensive repairs
and corrective work were required and consequently
4
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the building was not ready for occupancy until June
of 1964. (Compaint R. 16, Para. Ill).
On June 25, 1964, plaintiff commenced this
action by filing with the Clerk of the District Court
of Salt Lake County a complaint against defendants
Pereira, Fullmer Bros, and Allen Steel Company
seeking to recover damages suffered by plaintiff
by reason of said errors in design, construction, fabrication and erection of the building.
The matter before the Court concerns the validity of the three separate services of summons and
complaint made upon defendant Pereira by plaintiff and accomplished in the following manner:
1) On June 25, 1964 in Salt Lake City,
personal service of summons and a copy of the
complaint was made upon James S. Manning,
as defendant's agent and representative.
2) On June 30, 1964, in Salt Lake City,
service of summons and a copy of the complaint was made upon the Secretary of State
of the State of Utah.
3) On July 29, 1964, in Salt Lake City,
personal service of summons and a copy of
the complaint was made upon George S.
Mooney, as defendant's agent and representative.
The trial court erroneously found each of these
services to be invalid because:
1) As to Manning, he "was induced to
enter the State of Utah by plaintiff on or
about June 25, 1964, for the sole purpose on
5
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part of plaintiff of obtaining service . . ."
2) As to the Secretary of State, it was
not"in compliance with or authorized by any
statute of the State of Utah nor rule of civil
procedure."
3) As to Mooney, it was "attempted
after defendant's motion to quash the service
. . . on . . . Manning was filed and pending
before the court and before the court had disposed of said motion . . ."
The District Court found that at all times relevant to this decision the defendant was doing business in the State of Utah (Amended Judgment, R.
156, Para. 1)
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT
TO SERVICE UPON JAMES S. MANNING
The superintendent appointed by defendant to
reside in Salt Lake City during the construction
period, and to perform the duties required under
the provisions of the Architect's Agreement was
James S. Manning. (Pereira affidavit, R. 123, para.
9). This Agreement required the Architect to furnish Regular Supervision "during construction,"
and defines Regular Supervision as including :
1) full time supervision in Salt Lake City
during construction;
2) preparation of as-built drawings in collaboration with Contractor;
3) approval of mechanical systems before issuance of a completion certificate;
4) issuance of monthly estimates due contractor;
6
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5) checking of accounts of Contractor so as
to certify to their correctness before final
payment to the Contractor; and
6) issuance of a completion certificate when
all work is satisfactorily completed by the
Contractor. (R. 77,78,79)
In 1962, Mr. Manning and his family established
a residence in Salt Lake City, and he commenced
performance of defendant's contractual obligation
with plaintiff. (Manning affidavit 1, R. 31, para 6).
Mr. Manning opened an office in Salt Lake City in
defendant's name, hired a seceretary, obtained a
telephone and listings in defendant's name in the
Salt Lake City telephone directory, and from that
office handled defendant's business with Brigham
Young University at Provo, Utah, as well as with
plaintiff. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 104, para. 2, 3
Exhibit A).
In May of 1963, it was discovered that serious
failure in the structural steel support for the building would require extensive repairs and that the
completion of the building would consequently be
delayed until at least some time in the spring of
1964. (Donovan affidavit, R. 97, para. 5).
During May of 1964, plaintiff and defendant
had discussions concerning a possible breach of the
contract between plaintiff and defendant, arising
from alleged errors in design and in supervision of
construction which caused the structural steel failures. Plaintiff at this time advised defendant that
suit might be commenced against defendant because
of its negligence and breach of contract. (Donovan
7
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affidavit, R. 98, para. 5; Staten affidavit, R. 116,
para. 9).
Mr. Manning left Salt Lake City on June 10,
1964. At the time of his departure construction was
incomplete even though plaintiff was hoping to be
able to hold its grand opening on June 29. At this
time no final punch list of uncompleted items of
construction work had been issued by the defendant
Architect to the Contractor. The Contractor fully
expected and the job required that before June 29 a
final punch list be issued by the defendant (Peterson affidavit, R. 139, para. 6). The completion of
numerous items of construction work remained to
be verified by Mr. Manning on defendant's behalf,
and other contractual obligations of defendant, such
as issuance of a final completion certificate and
settlement of outstanding invoices, claims and liens
for labor and materials had not been completed.
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 105, para. 5; Staten affidavit, R. 113, para. 4; Donovan affidavit, R. 99,
para. 8; Peterson affidavit, R. 139, 140, para. 6, 7,
8, 9; Manning affidavit 2, R. 149, para. 5.) In fact,
the defendant has never issued a final punch list or
completion certificate as required by the Architect's
Agreement (Peterson affidavit, R. 140, para. 9).
At the time when Mr. Manning left Salt Lake
City on June 10, he told plaintiff and the Contractor
that he would be returning to Salt Lake City once
a week to complete work under the architect's contract and spend in Salt Lake City whatever amount
of time was required. (Kershisnik affidavit, R.
105, para. 4; Peterson affidavit, R. 138, para. 5.)
8
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From June 10, 1964 on, Mr. Kershisnik, plaintiffs
acting liaison officer between plaintiff, defendant
and the general contractor, Fullmer Bros., continuously urged, and was instructed by plaintiff's president to urge, Mr. Manning to return to Salt Lake
City to complete defendant's work. This was particularly necessary because of plaintiff's scheduled
grand opening of the building on June 29. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 105, para. 5; Donovan affidavit, R. 99, para. 8).
Finally, on June 19, 1964, Mr. Manning advised Mr. Kershisnik by phone that he would be
returning to Salt Lake City on June 21 or June 22
to perform certain portions of defendant's work
for plaintiff. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 106, para.
5). On Sunday, June 21, Mr. Manning arrived in
Salt Lake City, but he told Mr. Kershisnik that his
other work in Provo, Utah for Brigham Young University and in Los Angeles required his presence,
that he would be unable to do any work for plaintiff or remain in Salt Lake City, and he promised
and agreed to adjust his schedule and to tentatively
return to Salt Lake City on June 25. (Kershisnik
affidavit, R. 106, para. 6; Donovan affidavit, R.
99, para. 7, and R. 100, para. 9).
It is highly significant that none of these arrangements made by Mr. Manning on June 21 are
in any way denied by defendant.
At the time Mr. Manning conferred with Mr.
Kershisnik in Salt Lake City on June 21, neither
Mr. Kershisnik nor any other of plaintiff's person9
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nel, nor its attorneys had any knowledge of the
possibility of serving Mr. Manning with a copy of
the complaint and summons on June 25, nor did Mr.
Kershisnik nor any of plaintiff's personnel, nor its
attorneys, at this time have any intent or expectaof having Mr. Manning served on June 25. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 107, para. 8, and R. 110, para 16;
Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99„ para. 7, and R. 100,
para. 10). Moreover, at the time of Mr. Manning's
discussion with Mr. Kershisnik on June 21, none
of the attorneys for plaintiff had any knowledge
of Mr. Manning's tentative return on June 25, nor
even of his absence from Salt Lake City. (Staten
affidavit, R. 114, para. 4; Riter afidavit, R. 133,
134, para. 7; Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para 7).
On June 23, Mr. Manning by phone again confirmed to Mr. Kershisnik that he would arrive in
Salt Lake City on the evening of June 24 to comment performance of defendant's work. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 106, 107, para. 7; Manning affidavit 1, R. 31, 32, para. 8).
On June 23, 1964, plaintiff's President, Gene
Donovan (not including Mr. Kershisnik) held a
meeting with its attorneys to discuss preliminary
drafts of the proposed complaint herein; at said
meeting it was decided to put the complaint into
final form for filing prior to the grand opening
of the building, scheduled for June 29, 1964. (Donovan affidavit, R. 98, para. 7).
On the morning of June 24, 1964, plaintiff's
counsel advised plaintiff's president, Mr. Donovan,
10
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that the complaint was ready for filing, and asked
plaintiff's President, Mr. Donovan, for information
as to the availability of defendant or its agents for
service of process. (Donovan affidavit, R. 99, para.
7; Riter affidavit, R. 133, para. 7). Mr. Donovan,
not having nor knowing such information, called
Mr. Kershisnik into his office, and Mr. Kershisnik
then informed Mr. Donovan and plaintiff's attorneys for the first time, of Mr. Manning's promised
return to Salt Lake City that evening, to wit: June
24, 1964. (Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para. 7;
Riter affidavit, R. 133, para. 7; Staten affidavit,
R. 113,114, para. 4).
At no time prior to this meeting on June 24,
1964 did plaintiff's attorneys have any knowledge
of the fact that Mr. Manning had promised to return to Salt Lake City on the evening of June 24,
or that Mr. Manning had ever departed from Salt
Lake City. (Staten affidavit, R. 113, 114, para, 4;
Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99, para. 7; Riter affidavit, R. 133, 134, para. 7). Moreover, at no time
prior to June 24, 1964, did any of plaintiff's employees or personnel, including Mr. Kershisnik, have
any knowledge that a complaint might be in final
form for filing and service, or of the possibility of
service upon defendant during Mr. Manning's visit
on June 24 and 25. (Donovan affidavit, R. 98, 99,
para. 7; Kershisnik -affidavit, R. 107, para. 9).
Upon learning on June 24, 1964 of Mr. Manning's promised arrival in Salt Lake City that evening, arrangements were then made for serving him
11
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with summons and a copy of the complaint. Such
service was made upon Mr. Manning in his room
at the Hotel Utah in Salt Lake City on the following morning, June 25, 1964. (Staten affidavit, R.
115, para. 7). When this service was made, Mr.
Manning and Mr. Kershisnik were discussing invoices and correspondence as required by the 'architects contract dating back to the first of June which
had not been processed. (Kershisnik affidavit, R.
108, para. 12; Staten affidavit, R. 116, para. 8).
After service had been made, Mr. Manning continued to undertake certain matters of business between the parties with respect to the completion
of the building, as required by the architects contract, including examination of part of the structure and discussion with representatives of Fullmer
Bros., the general contractor, concerning the retarded progress of the work and the final punch list.
(Kershisnik affidavit, R. 109, 110, para. 14; Peterson affidavit, R. 140, 141, para. 10).
Defendant on July 14, 1964, moved to quash
service of process obtained by service upon Mr.
Manning on the ground that such service was procured by fraudulently enticing Mr. Manning into
the State of Utah. The District Court ordered the
service quashed on the ground that Mr. Manning
was "induced to enter the State of Utah by plaintiff for the sole purpose on part of plaintiff of
obtaining service of summons and complaint."
(Amended Judgment, R. 157, para. 6).
12
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STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT
TO SERVICE UPON THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Defendant at all times material to the instant
proceeding, was and is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of California.
(Pereira affidavit, R. 121, para. 2). At all times
material hereto, defendant was doing business in
the State of Utah. (Amended Judgment, R. 156,
para. 1.) Defendant has never procured a certificate of authority to do business in Utah, as required
by section 16-10-102 of the Utah Code. (Pereira
affidavit, R. 121, para. 2; Staten affidavit, R. 117,
para. 12 (b).)
On June 30, 1964, the summons and a copy of
the complaint was served upon the Secretary of
State of the State of Utah. Even though defendant
had not moved to quash this service, the District
Court held that such service was void since "not in
compliance with nor authorized by any statute of
the State of Utah nor rule of court procedure."
(Amended Judgment, R. 157, para. 5).
STATEMENT OF FACTS WITH RESPECT
TO SERVICE ON MR. MOONEY
Mr. Mooney was the Construction Superintendent or Chief Superintendent for defendant during
the course of construction of plaintiff's building.
(Donovan affidavit, R. 100, para. 12). Service was
made upon him on July 29, 1964, while he was in
Salt Lake City discussing with plaintiff matters relating to the mechanical systems in plaintiff's build13
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ing (the air conditioning system). By the specific
terms of plaintiff's contract with defendant, defendant was required to check and approve the mechanism system prior to issuance of the completion certificate (Contract, R. 79, para. 5(i)) and Mr.
Mooney was engaged in performing this contractual
obligation on behalf of defendant at the time service was made. (Donovan affidavit, R. 100,101, para.
12; Mooney affidavit, R. 119, para. 6).
The District Court held that service upon Mr.
Mooney was void because it was made after defendant's motion to quash the service of summons
on James S. Manning was filed and pending, and
before the court had disposed of defendant's said
motion to quash. (Amended Judgment, R. 157,
para. 7).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT BY PERSONAL
SERVICE UPON MR. MANNING WAS VALID SINCE
HE WAS NOT INDUCED BY FRAUD OR OTHER
DECEIT TO ENTER THE STATE OF UTAH FOR THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF SERVING HIM WITH PROCESS.

Initially, it should be pointed out that the
Amended Judgment entered by the District Court
was based exclusively upon the affidavits, stipulations and statements of points and authorities submitted by both parties herein. (Amended Judgment,
R. 155). No oral testimony was offered, and no
cross-examination undertaken before the court. In
these circumstances, the principle that findings of
the lower court will not be set aside when the evi14
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dence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly
insufficient, is not applicable. Even if it were, the
evidence supporting the validity of the services of
summons here is plentiful, convincing and uncontroverted by defendant, and defendant's conclusionary allegations supporting its motions to quash are
clearly insufficient.
Where the evidence in the trial court consists
entirely documentary material and affidavits, it
is abundantly clear that this Court will and should
review the evidence de novo in determining the merit
of defendant's motions to quash. As early as 1900
this Court recognized that in all cases wherein resolution of the matter depends solely upon an examination of affidavits or depositions, the matter
should be decided anew:
"This court has frequently held that, even on
appeals in equity cases, notwithstanding both
questions of law and fact are subject to review, the findings of the trial court will not
be set aside when the evidence is conflicting,
unless the evidence is clearly insufficient . . .
All of these cases relate to findings in trials
on the merits, and the reason on which they
are based has no application whatever to motions for new trials. In a trial on the merits
the witnesses are subject to cross-examination, and, being in view of the trial judge
or referee, he has a better opportunity to
judge of their credibility than the appellate
court. On a motion for a new trial supported
and resisted, as in the case at bar, on ex parte
affidavits, those making the affidavits are
not subject to cross-examination, and, not being before the trial judge, his opportunity to
judge of their credibility and the weight of
15
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their statements is no better than the appellate court. In all such cases, and in equity
cases where the evidence consists exclusively
of depositions, the reason upon which the
decisions quoted are based fails, and the rule
established by them has no application to such
cases." Wright v. Union Pac. R. Co., 22 Utah,
338, 62 Pac. 317, 318-319 (1900), emphasis
added.
Plaintiff submits that the affidavits on file
herein disclose that Mr. Manning entered the state
of Utah voluntarily, for the purpose of attending
to continuing and uncompleted business between
the plaintiff and defendant, and that no fraud, false
representations or other deceit were employed to
induce him to enter Utah for the purpose of serving
him with process.
A thorough examination of the cases relating
to the procurement of service of process by fraudulent enticement, trickery or deceit discloses that the
courts uniformly apply the following principles:
(1) In order to quash service on the ground
of enticement, the evidence must show convincingly
that plaintiff by false representations, fraud or other
deceit, induced defendant to enter plaintiff's jurisdiction for the sole purpose of serving him with process, and that but for plaintiffs enticement, defendant would not have exposed himself to service.
Therefore, if plaintiff has demanded or requested
defendant's presence to accomplish some valid purpose between the parties, or if defendant voluntarily
enters the state to attend to existing business affairs, service of process is not invalidated by plain16
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tiff's decision to serve defendant while the latter
is within plaintiff's jurisdiction attending to such
matters, even though this thought may have been in
plaintiff's mind when defendant was asked to come.
Certainly if there is no thought in plaintiff's mind
of any service of process at the time arrangements
are made for defendant to come into the state on a
legitimate business errand, there can be no enticement — and this is the instant case.
(2) While a defendants Who has entered
plaintiff's jurisdiction in connection with such legal
process as attendance at a trial or settlement negotiations is granted an immunity from service of
process for a reasonable time thereafter, such immunity does not extend to private, non-judicial business between the parties.
There appears to be no dispute between the
parties as to the validity of the foregoing principles.
Moreover, there appears to be no material conflict
in the evidence as to the facts to which these principles are to be applied. The District Court found
that Mr. Manning was induced to enter Utah for
the "sole purpose" of serving him with process.
Plaintiff contends that the affidavits submitted
herein cannot possibly support such a finding and
indeed show conclusively that Mr. Manning's presence in Utah resulted solely from plaintiff's demands, made in complete good faith, that defendant finish the work it had agreed to perform, and
that no fraud, false representations or other deceit
were employed to entice Mr. Manning into Utah
for the purpose of serving him with process. This
17
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is manfestly true from the undisputed facts that,
when the demands for and the promise and the
agreement on Manning's part to come were made,
service of process on Manning was not even contemplated by defendant, its officers, employees or attorneys. The following application of the foregoing
legal principles to the uncontroverted facts of this
case will demonstrate that Mr. Manning was not
"fraudulently enticed" into Utah by plaintiff.
The applicable rule of law is clearly stated in
the recent case of Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 137 N.E.2d
419 (Ct. App. Ohio 1956), appeal dismissed, 140
N.E.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1957), wherein plaintiff invited defendant to visit their child, and later
decided to serve him with process after he had arrived :
"His (defendant's) coming to Cleveland was
not induced through trickery, fraud or artifice because it is clear that the invitation was
extended in good faith and for the purposes
stated. There is no evidence whatever that the
plaintiff was resorting to trickery, deceit or
artifice to get the defendant into this jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining service
upon him. To vitiate the personal service of
summons upon a person in a foreign jurisdiction in response to an invitation extended him
by a party to the action, an intent to trick and
deceive him into coming for such purpose
must have existed in the mind of the sender
and the invitation itself must have been an
integral part of the device or artifice employed to get the defendant into the foreign jurisdiction for the purpose of serving him with
summons." (137 N.E.2d at p. 421, emphasis
added).
18
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The Guzzetta case discloses at least three essential elements prerequisite before service of process
will be quashed on the ground of fraudulent enticement:
1) An intent to trick and deceive defendant
into coming to plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes
of serving process upon him;
2) An act on plaintiff's part constituting
fraud, trickery or deceit; and
3) A concurrence of such act or intent, by virtue of an invitation made with the intent to trick
and deceive and constituting an integral part of the
fraudulent scheme.
None of these elements exist in the instant
case. At the time Mr. Kershisnik was making his
continual demands for Mr. Manning to return to
Salt Lake City to complete defendant's work, and
on June 21 when Manning promised and agreed
to come about June 25 and on June 23 when Manning confirmed he would arrive on June 24, Mr.
Kershisnik had no knowledge that a complaint was
being prepared against defendant or that process
would be served upon Mr. Manning. Mr. Kershisnik had no knowledge until June 24, after Mr. Manning had already arranged his arrival in Salt Lake
City. Other than Mr. Kershisnik, none of plaintiff's
personnel knew prior to June 24 that Mr. Manning
would be in Salt Lake City on that date and none
of plaintiffs personnel knew before June 24 that
a summons and complaint would be ready for service
by June 24. Therefore, borrowing from the fore19
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going language of the Guzzetta case, there was no
intent in the mind of the sender of the invitation
to trick and deceive Mr. Manning into coming to
Utah for purposes of serving him.
Mr. Manning, in his first affidavit, asserts
that Mr. Kershisnik later admitted to him that he
had prior knowledge that Mr. Manning would be
served "that morning and in the hotel room." Mr.
Kershisnik pointed out in his affidavit that he did
have knowledge that "service was going to be attempted at some time while Manning was in Salt
Lake City" but it was not acquired until June 2b,
after Mr. Manning's a/rrwal had been arranged, and
that he did not know service "was going to be made
at his hotel." Mr. Kershisnik^ statement is thus
easily explained: At the time Mr. Manning was
served in the hotel room on June 25, Mr. Kershisnik did know of plaintiff's decision to serve Mr.
Manning at some time on June 25, such decision
having been made by plaintiff on June 24 and the
knowledge acquired by Kershisnik on that same day.
But he did not know Where service would be made.
While Mr. Kershisnik's statement that he had no
knowledge of service was inaccurate, such inaccuracy is immaterial to the issues herein. Any knowledge which Mr. Kershisnik had was not acquired
until after Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake
City had been promised and arranged, and could
not therefore, have been any factor in the making
of these arrangements.
Another illustrative case directly in point is
20
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Ex Parte Taylor, 69 Atl. 553 (R.I. 1908). There,
plaintiff's employees and agents invited defendant
to meet with plaintiff-receiver to discuss business
matters with respect to a receivership of a trust
company. At the time the invitation was made, these
employees and agents had no knowledge that plaintiff intended to sue and serve defendant with process, nor did plaintiff know that the invitation had
been made. Consequently, the court held that service was proper since the invitation was not made
with the intent to serve defendant, and no fraud or
other deceit was employed to entice him into plaintiff's jurisdiction.
Similarly, Mr. Kershisnik, when on June 21
Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake City on June
25 was arranged, had no knowledge that a complaint
was being prepared or that plaintiff was contemplating service of any kind against defendant while
Manning was to be in Salt Lake City. In fact, on
June 21, when this arrangement was made, neither
plaintiff nor its attorneys knew when the complaint
would be ready for filing and service. Moreover,
plaintiff and its attorneys did not know on June 21
that an arrangement had been made for Mr. Manning's presence on June 25. Mannings presence on
June 25 was learned by plaintiff and its attorneys
after they made their decision on June 24 to file
the complaint. The Taylor case fully supports the
Guzzetta rule that enticement only exists where
there is a concurrence of fraudulent act and intent.
Plaintiff's affidavits disclose that no such act or intent existed and that no such concurrence was present.
0i
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Under the rules of law above stated, even assuming for sake of argument that Mr. Kershisnik
had known at the times he demanded Mr. Manning's
presence in Salt Lake City that service would be
attempted upon him, no fraudulent enticement would
exist in the absence of proof that Mr. Kershisnik
or plaintiff's other personnel had an intent to deceive Mr. Manning, and that an act of fraud was
actually committed. A mere invitation or demand
for defendant's presence, even though coupled with
a hope to serve him ( does not constitute fraudulent
enticement where the invitation or demand was
made to accomplish some other valid purpose between the parties, and where no false representatkms Wave been made to induce defendant to enter
plaintiffs jurisdiction. (1^2 Am. Jur. Process § 35,
p. 33). As stated by the United States Supreme
Court in Jaster v. Cnrrie, 198 U.S. 144,148, (1904),
the mere hope of serving defendant while he is present in plaintiff's jurisdiction is immaterial, in the
absence of proof that plaintiff made false representations or committed other deceit or trickery.
lams v. Tedlock, 204 Pac. 537 (Kan. 1922)
illustrates the rule that a valid business purpose inducing defendant's presence in plaintiff's jurisdiction precludes a finding of enticement. There, defendant-trustee was notified by one of plaintiff's
officers to attend a meeting of the trustees in plaintiff's county. Defendant was served with process by
plaintiff while within the county for the purpose
of attending this meeting. He contended that his
presence was enticed by fraud. The court disagreed :
22
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"No false statement was made to Wilson to
induce him to go to Junction City. It was the
duty of the secretary to notify Wilson of the
meeting of the trustees; it would have been
an act of bad faith on the part of the secretary not to notify Wilson. As a trustee of the
gas company, it was Wilson's duty to attend
that meeting. There was important business
to be transacted — the employment of attorneys to defend in pending litigation — and,
although that matter was not attended to, the
failure to do so did not render the meeting
fraudulent." (204 Pac. at 538, emphasis
added).
Similarly, it was the duty of Mr. Kershisnik,
as acting liaison officer between plaintiff, general
contractor and defendant, to take such steps as he
thought necessary to insure performance and completion of the work, such as insisting that defendant's resident architect, Mr. Manning, be present
"during construction," to verify the completion of
items of work, approve outstanding invoices and
issue completion certificates. Clearly this was part
of the architect's unperformed obligations. It was
the duty of Mr. Manning, as defendant's representative, to be present "during construction" and comply
with Mr. Kershisnik's request to perform such work.
This is spelled out in the Architect's Agreement between the parties set forth at pages 2-4 hereof. (See
R. 78,79,para.c,f-k).
It is manifest from these contractual provisions that defendant had agreed in a very specific
form on all of the services which it would render
"during construction." These include specifically
23
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the various things referred to in sub-paragraphs
(f) through (k) of paragraph 5, of the said
Architects contract, including the issuance of a
completion certificate. In addition, the defendant
agreed that the supervision of these specific
things which it had agreed to perform would
require the presence, full-time, in Salt Lake City
of an authorized representative during the whole of
the construction period. Defendant's self-serving
assertions that supervision was no longer required
after June 10 are thus immaterial, since defendant
was contractually bound to offer such supervision
during the entire construction period, whether or
not defendant thought such supervision was required. It was the defendant who breached this
contract by removing the full-time supervision from
Salt Lake City before all of these items of work
were completed and fully performed. It would be
a perversion of the contract and justice to even suggest that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to prove
that the defendant's presence in Salt Lake City
was needed when the defendant had already agreed
in the contract that this was so. Nevertheless, the
necessity of defendant's presence is elaborately set
forth in the affidavits of Messrs. Donovan and Kershisnik, referred to hereinabove. Plaintiff also refers the Court to the affidavit of Mr. Charles Peterson, construction superintendent for the general
contractor, Fullmer Bros., with respect to plaintiff's
project. Mr. Peterson, at pages 2-5, paragraphs
5-11, of his affidavit, discusses in great detail the
nature of the work remaining to be performed by
24
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defendant, and the importance of completing such
work prior to the grand opening of the building on
June 29, 1964. (R. 138-141).
Mr. Kershisnik having a duty to request the
presence of Mr. Manning when in his judgment such
presence was required, and Mr. Manning having a
duty to be present in Salt Lake City on a full-time
basis during the construction period, it is clear that
the latter's presence was neither induced nor even
invited: It was required by the very nature of the
business relationship and contractual obligations existing between the parties. While it may have later
transpired that the business Which required Mr.
Manning's presence could not be fully accomplished
by reason of Mr. Manning's refusal to undertake it,
as in the lams case, that fact could not invalidate the
service validly secured by reason of the business and
contractual relationship hereinabove discussed.
On the question of whether or not Mr. Manning's presence was required in Salt Lake City by
virtue of the work remaining uncompleted by defendant, the District Court merely found that when
Mr. Manning left Salt Lake City on June 10, 1964,
"the Prudential Building was substantially finished
and the day-to-day presence of James Manning was
no longer required." (Amended Judgment, R. 156,
para. 2).
Plaintiff has never contended that Mr. Manning's presence was required on a "day-to-day"
basis after June 10, 1964. Plaintiff does contend
and the record is clear that after June 10 there
25
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remained unperformed several important items of
work requiring the presence and supervision of defendant or its agent, and that Mr. Kershisnik's repeated demands upon Mr. Manning thereafter were
made in good faith to -accomplish the performance
of this work prior to the scheduled grand opening
of the building on June 29, 1964. In fact the District Court found that at all times relevant to this
issue the defendant was doing business in the State
of Utah. (Amended Judgment, R. 156, para. 1).
Plaintiff submits that there is absolutely no
evidence in defendant's affidavits or pleading that
Mr. Kershisnik's requests for Mr. Manning's presence were made in bad faith, without any valid
business purpose, solely to induce Mr. Manning into
Salt Lake City for purposes of service of process.
Indeed, any suggestion of foul play or trickery is
fully controverted by plaintiff's affidavits and the
contract between the parties. The affidavits not
only fail to disclose, but to the contrary negative
the existence of any scheme or plan aimed at serving defendant with process.
Clearly, no such scheme could have existed on
or before June 21, when Mr. Manning arrived in
Salt Lake City to discuss business matters with Mr.
Kershisnik. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 106, para. 6).
/ / it had existed, plaintiff could and would have
served Mr. Manning at this time by service of a
10 day summons. It should be emphasized that it
was on June 21, in the presence of Mr. Kershisnik,
in Salt Lake City, that Mr. Manning arranged for
a tentative return to Salt Lake City on June 25. It
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is so improbable as to be beyond belief that this arrangement, made on June 21 in plaintiffs jurisdiction (State of Utah) for Mr. Manning's return to
Salt Lake City four days later, was part of a fraudulent scheme to entice Mr. Manning back to Salt Lake
City for purpose of serving him with process. Mr.
Kershisnik had advance notice of Mr. Manning's
scheduled arrival in Salt Lake City on June 21 or
22 and yet no attempt was made to serve him at this
time. (Kershisnik affidavit, R. 105, 106, para. 5).
The fact that Mr. Manning was not served with
summons when he arrived on June 21 precludes any
finding that plaintiff lured Mr. Manning into Utah
on June 25 for the sole purpose of serving him with
process. Plaintiff's decision to serve Mr. Manning
was not arrived at until after the arrangements for
his return to Salt Lake City had been concluded.
These arrangements were made without knowledge
of and without any relationship to any possible
service of process. There is no evidence whatsoever
to the contrary.
Defendant's burden of persuasion in this case
is clearly set forth in Crandall v. Trowbridge, 150
N.W. 669 (Iowa 1915), involving the proof required to avoid service of process on the ground of fraudulent enticement:
"[A]s between honest and dishonest motives
and purposes we should presume honesty of
intent and purpose, unless the facts and circumstances are such as to satisfy the mind
that the acts and statements relied upon are
fraudulent or dishonest." (150 N.W. at p.
670, emphasis added.)
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Plaintiff submits that the presumption of its
honesty of intent and purposes has not been rebutted
or even challenged by defendant herein. As stated
in a recent case involving fraudulent service of process:
"[A] finding of fraud must rest on something
more substantial than suspicion, surmise arid
speculation . . . for the 'precept is that one is
not permitted to give weight to smoke, and
suspicion is but smoke.' . . . Furthermore, the
general rule is that he who asserts fraud has
the burden of making it manifest. . . and 'if
in the pursuit of fraud, two judicial views
are open on the facts, one in favor of honesty,
the other contra, the law (an invention of
men for their welfare) but agrees with human nature in saying we must take the nobler
view: " (Glaze v. Glaze, 311 S.W.2d 575, 579
(Ct. App. Mo. 1958), emphasis added).
For further cases upholding service of process
upon principles consistent with those discussed hereinabove see Nowell v. Nowell, 190 A.2d 233 (Super.
Ct. Conn. 1963); Schwartz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery
Mills, 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940); Siro v. American Express Co., 121 Atl. 280 (Conn. 1923); Case
v. Smith, Lineaweaver & Co., 152 Fed. 730 (E.D.
N.Y. 1907).
Defendant submitted to the District Court a
memorandum of points and authorities whidh cited
only two cases with respect to the issue of fraudulent enticement, both of which concern the question
of immunity in settlement situations. Consequently
neither are controlling nor apposite here.
Attacks upon the service of process upon non28
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resident defendants fall into two separate categories : fraudulent enticement, discussed above, and
immunity during judicial proceedings. This distinction is made in Restatement of Judgments, Section
15, Comment (b), at page 81:
"Where the defendant is brought into the state
by fraud of the plaintiff, or comes into the
£tate voluntarily as a witness in or a party
to the judicial proceedings, he has a privilege
not to be sued in the state."
In Western States Refining Co. v. Berry, 6
U.2d 336, 313 P.2d 480 (1957), this Court extended
the principle of immunity applicable to judicial proceedings to situations wherein defendant is within
plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes of settlement
negotiations. This Court did not purport to limit
or extend the principles relating to fraudulent enticement. The exact holding of the Court is as follows:
"One who is invited into a jurisdiction to discuss compromise and settlement of a disputed
matter will not be subject to service of process in that matter, if he comes into the jurisdiction for the sole purpose of discussing compromise and settlement, by the one extending
the invitation, for a reasonable period involved in coming to the negotiations and returning therefrom, as well as during the period
of actual presence at the negotiations, unless
the party extending the invitation advises
him at the time the invitation is extended
that he will be served with process immediately if settlement negotiations fail." (313
P.2d at pp. 481-482, emphasis added).
A brief discussion of the principles upon which
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the Berry case was decided is sufficient to demonstrate its inapplicability to the present case.
First of all, it seems clear that in Berry, this
Court was merely extending to settlement discussions the general rule whidi confers immunity from
service of process upon witnesses and parties while
attending court in a state or county other than that
of their residence. This analysis of Berry is verified by an examination of the cases cited therein.
The court cited Mertens v. McMahon, 66 S.W.2d
127 (Mo. 1933), which was concerned only with
the immunity of defendant by reason of his presence in court on another action brought by plaintiff. This Court also cited State ex rel. Elian v. District Court, 33 P.2d 526 (Mont. 1934), wherein the
court expressly extended the rule of immunity by
reason of attendance at trial to settlement situations.
The other cases cited in Berry, Gampel v. Gampel,
114 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1952), and Ultcht
v. Ultcht, 126 Atl. 440 (Ct. Ch. N.J. 1924), merely
hold that where the defendant is invited into plaintiff's jurisdiction to discuss settlement of their differences, defendant is immune from service for a
reasonable time thereafter. Therefore, neither the
opinion in Berry nor the cases upon which it relied
cases upon wich it relied suggests that the immunity
rule should be extended further than situations in
which a non-resident defendant has been induced to
enter plaintiff's jurisdiction for purposes of settling and compromising disputes.
The reason for extending immunity to settle30
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ment situations appears to be reasonable: By reason
of a plaintiff's offer or agreement to enter into
negotiations aimed ^t settling disputes between the
parties, plaintiff has in effect agreed to refrain
from inimical proceedings until a reasonable time
.after sudh negotiations have failed. However, where
defendant's presence is requested to accomplish business purposes other than settlement or negotiations,
plaintiff cannot be deemed to have raised any such
flag of truce. Thus, in lams v. Tedlock, supra the
court noted that:
"Wilson (defendant) knew of the dispute between himself and the plaintiffs, he ought to
have known that the dispute might be considered at the meeting and might develop into
litigation." (204 Pac. at 538)
On its facts the Berry case is completely dissimilar to our situation. In Berry, the defendant was
a non-resident of the State of Utah, who had never
done any business in the State of Utah, had no purpose in coming to the State of Utah except at the
instance of the plaintiff's specific request for a
settlement discussion, and came to Utah only to discuss settlement of problems concerning a lease on
property in the State of Idaho between the parties.
In our case, defendant had been doing business in
the State of Utah since at least 1962 for plaintiff
and other clients, including Brigham Young University. Defendant was still doing such business on
June 25 when it was served, and still had a substantial amount of business yet to do before its contract
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with plaintiff would be completed. Defendant had
been doing this business principally through Mr.
Manning who resided in Utah, at least until June
10, 1964. Mr. Manning returned to Utah on June
24 for the purpose of determining what amount of
construction work had been performed and what
still had to be done, and Manning did not return
to Utah for any discussion of settlement concerning
any dispute between plaintiff and defendant. There
is no question that Manning was defendant's agent,
and there is no question that defendant knew that
Manning was returning to Utah. There is likewise
no question that defendant allowed Manning to do
this with full knowledge that a substantial dispute
existed between plaintiff and defendant and that
legal proceedings were imminent against defendant.
(Amended Judgement, R. 156, para. 2).
Since the evidence discloses that Mr. Manning
returned to the State of Utah on June 24 to perform defendant's contractual obligations to plaintiff, and that the arrangements for his return were
made on June 21, at a time when the possibility of
service upon him was ncrt even contemplated by
plaintiff. It is clear as a matter of law that no
fraud, false representations or other deceit were
employed to entice Mr. Manning into Utah for the
purpose of serving him. Plaintiff submits that defendants's motion to quash service upon Mr. Manning should have been denied and that the lower
court's decision granting said motion must be reversed.
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POINT II
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT BY SERVICE UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF UTAH
WAS VALID SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROCURE A CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY TO DO BUSINESS IN UTAH AND IS THEREFORE ESTOPPED TO
DENY ITS DESIGNATION OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AS ITS AGENT.

It is interesting to notice that a motion to quash
the service upon the Secretary of State was not even
before the District Court. Defendant had filed motions only to quash service upon Manning and upon
Mooney. The law as to the propriety of this service
was never briefed for the District Court. Plaintiff's
first knowledge of any ruling upon or consideration
of this point by the trial court came when the court's
order was served upon it. At this stage plaintiff decided there was no purpose to be served in raising
this procedural point, since the court had already
ruled on the substantive point, albeit erroneously.1
Rule 4 (e) (4) of the Uta!h Rules of Civil Procedure permits service of process upon any corporation to be made by serving any "agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
Utah Code Ann., Section 16-10-102 (1953) as
amended, provides in part that:
"No foreign corporation shall have the right
1. The sole basis given by the court for the ruling on this issue
is that the service was not permitted by the Utah Statutes or
rules of Procedure. The erroneous rule of "no further service when
a motion to quash is pending", which the court followed in quashing service on Mooney obviously could not apply to the service on
the Secretary of State. This is because service on the Secretary of
State was made on July 1, 1964 (E. 26), and defendant's motion
to quash service on Manning was not filed until July 14, 1964
(R. 27).
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to transact business in this state until it shall
have procured a certificate of authority so
to do from the Secretary of State."
Section 16-10-106 (d) requires the foreign
corporation to state in its application for a certificate of authority the name and address of its proposed registered agent in Utah.
Section 16-10-111 provides that the registered
agent so appointed shall be an agent of the corporation upon whom service of process may be served.
This section also provides as follows:
"Whenever a foreign corporation authorized
to transact business in this state shall fail
to appoint or maintain a registered agent in
this state, or whenever any such registered
agent cannot with reasonable diligence be
found at the registered office, or Whenever
the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation shall be suspended or revoked, then
the secretary of state shall be an agent of such
corporation upon whom any such process, notice or demand may be served."
While defendant was never authorized to transact
business in Utah, it is clear that defendant is
estopped to rely upon its admitted failure to qualify
to do business in Utah, as a means of defeating the
state's jurisdiction over it. This rule has been recited in numerous cases involving statutes of other
states substantially identical to section 16-10-111,
and this rule is clearly the majority view, as stated
in 23 Am. Jur., Foreign Corporations, section 499,
page 513:
"There is a difference of opinion on the ques34
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tion whether a foreign corporation doing business within the state without complying with
a statute requiring, as a condition perecedent,
the designation of a state official to accept
service of process ought, under the applicable
state statutes, to be held bound by service on
such official. The weight of authority supports the view that by doing business in the
state, the corporation necessarily submits to
the service of process against it on the officer whom it must have designated had any
designation been made, and is estopped to
deny that it has made the designation provided the suit is one to which the state may
subject such corporations doing business in
its territory." (Emphasis Added).
As stated in Old Wayne Life Ass'n. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 21-22 (1907) :
"Undoubtedly, it was competent for Pennsylvania to declare that no insurance corporation should transact business within its limits
without filing the written stipulation specified in its statute . . . It is equally true that
if an insurance corporation of another state
stransacts business in Pennsylvania without
complying with its provisions it will be deemed to have assented to any valid terms prescribed by that Commonwealth as a condition
of its right to do business there; and it will
be estopped to say that it had not done what
it should have done in order that it might
lawfully enter that Commonwealth and there
exert its corporate powers. (Emphasis added).
In Flinn v. Western Mut. Life Ass'n, 171 N.W.
711 (Iowa 1919), the court followed the rule in the
Old Wayne Life Assyn case, supra, in upholding ser35
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vice of process upon the state auditor against a foreign insurance company which had failed to comply
with the following statute, which provided in pertinent part:
"Every life insurance company . . . shall, before receiving a certificate to do business in
this state or any renewal thereof, file in the
office of the auditor of state an agreement
in writing that thereafter service of notice
or process of any kind may be made on the
auditor of state, and when so made shall be
valid, binding and effective for all purposes
as if served upon the company according to
the laws of this or any other state, and waiving all claim or right of error by reason of
such acknowledgment of service.''
By its terms, the statute applied only to foreign
corporations Which filed the requisite agreement
before receiving a certificate of authority. However,
the court held that defendant Was estopped to deny
its compliance with the statute:
"Compliance with the requirements of this
section having been obligatory upon the defendant every day for that last 20 years, it
is obligatory upon it now. Because it was and
is obligatory, it will be conclusively presumed
as against the corporation that it did comply
with such requirements, and its rights will
be determined on the theory of such compliance.'9 (171 N.W. at 713, emphasis added).
The court in North American Union v. Oliphint,
217 S.W. 1 (Ark. 1919) reached a similar result:
"It is first insisted by appellant that the court
erred in refusing to quash the service of summons upon it. The summons was served upon
the state insurance commissioner, under Act
462, Acts of the General Assembly of 1917.
36
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That Act requires fraternal benefit societies,
as a prerequisite to obtaining a license to do
business in the state, to appoint the superintendent of insurance their agent upon whom
legal process might be served. No such appointment was made; hence appellant had no
license to do business in the state. It follows
that the superintendent of insurance was not
appellant's agent, upon whom service might
be had, and the service was invalid, unless appellant is estopped to deny service, by having done business in the state in violation of
the statute. If appellant was doing business
in the state, it was violating the statute, and
is estopped to deny that it had a license or
that the superintendent of insurance ivas its
agent for purposes of service." (217 S.W.
at 5, emphasis added). Accord: Ehrman v.
Teutonia Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 471, 476-477 (D.
Ark. 1880).
In Brown v. Globe Laboratories, 84 N.W.2d
•151 (Neb. 1957), the court upheld service of process upon the Secretary of State under section 211201 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, which
provides in pertinent part:
". . . Such foreign corporation shall also make
and file a certificate . . . appointing an agent
or agents in this state, who shall be designoted by his official title, and one of whom
shall reside at such principal place of business, upon whom process . . . may be served;
and such service of process or of any such
other legal notice as aforesaid upon the Secretary of State . . . ,or upon any such agent
or agents, shall constitute valid service upon
such corporation . . . ."
While the section on its face applies only to
corporations which filed the requisite certificate
37
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of appointment as a condition to qualifying to do
business in Nebraka, such substituted service was
held proper upon all foreign corporations which
transact business in the state:
"Even though a foreign corporation has not
expressly consented to such jurisdiction but
is actually doing business in this state, then a
valid service of process may be made against
it upon the Secretary of State." (84 N.W.2d
at 157).
In Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 300 N.W.
840 (Neb. 1941), the court upheld service of process upon the auditor of public accounts under a
similar statute, as against defendant foreign corporation which had failed to qualify or appoint a
resident agent. Accord: Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corporation, 117 F.2d 488, 490 (8th Cir. 1941).
The courts of South Dakota have uniformly
applied the principal of estoppel to prevent a foreign
corporation from taMng advantage of its own failure to comply with state law as a means of avoiding substituted service of process. In Clay v. Kent
Oil Co., 38 N.W.2d 258 (S.D. 1949), the court
stated the rule as follows:
"Having failed to do that which our law required of it as conditions under which it was
to be or may have been permitted by license
to transact business in this state, appellant
now says that such failure on its part has resulted in a denial to respondent of that recourse which the law of the state demanded
that it maintain for respondent's aid and
benefit . . . [W]e think it proper to hold that
if a foreign corporation fails to comply with
38
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the laws of this state, but is still engaged in
business therein, and permitted to carry on
such business, it must transact its business
here subject to the laws of the state, and its
assent to service upon the Secretary of State
is implied. See authorities cited in note 2, 113
A.L.R. 16. It is observed that our code, SDC
11.2002, denied to appellant the right to transact business in this state until such time as
it should comply with the provisions of SDC
11.20. Having voluntarily assumed the right
to engage in business in South Dakota we
think that appellant should not now be heard
to say that it did not authorize the Secretary
of State to act for it in the formal matter of
accepting a summons, an outgrowth of the
exercise of such assumed right. We recognize
that this view is not universally adopted, as
is made to appear in 23 Am. Jur., Foreign
Corporations, §§ 495 and 499. However, our
review of the question induces an adherence
to the rule quoted from the former opinion
of this court and leads us to the belief that the
decided weight of authority sustains the validity of the service employed to bring appellant
into court." (38 N.W.2d at 259-260, emphasis added).
Accord: Uhlich v. Hilton Mobile Homes, 126
N.W.2d 813, 816 (S.D. 1964).
The principle of estoppel has been employed in
like circumstances by the Suoreme Court of Utah.
Wein v. Crockett, 113 U t ^ l 9 5 P.2d 222, 231
(1948), involved the application of Section 104-5-11
(10) Utah Code Ann. (1943), whMi section provided for service of process upon the manager, superintendant or agent designated by the non-resident
in a certificate to be filed with the Secretary of
39
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State. Plaintiff contended that since he had never
appointed any person in Utah as his agent for purposes of service of process, service upon one of his
agents was improper. The court stated the applicable rule as follows :
"Plaintiff was required to designate an agent
on the effective date of the act, and his failure
to comply with the law cannot be used as a
reason for defeating defendant's right to
claim the benefit of the statute. Not having
designated an agent, plaintiff cannot be heard
to complain, if the agent served is one designated by statute. Even though plaintiff, at
the time he entered into the contract with the
defendant, did not impliedly consent to be
sued in the courts of this state, by continuing
to operate his business after the act became
effective he impliedly consented to being served in the manner provided by the act . . "
(195 P.2d at 231, emphasis added).
By transacting business in Utah without a certificate of authority, defendant is estopped to rely
upon its failure to comply with the law in order to
defeat plaintiff's right to claim the benefit of section 16-10-111, U.C.A. 1953, and defendant has
impliedly consented to substituted service upon the
Secretary of State. It would indeed be an anomalous
situation if a violation of the law is to be recognized
•as a basis for depriving the courts of this state of
jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of
the lawbreaker's activities in this state. If this is
the law, Why should any corporation ever qualify
to do business? This court has already expressed
its opinion on this general subject in Wein v. Crockett, supra, when it stated at p. 314:
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"If the cause of action arises in this state, out
of business being transacted in this state, the
probabilities are that the witnesses will be
readily available here; the law of this state
will control and determine the cause of action ; and the courts here would be the forums
of convenience for the trial of the action. To
require a resident who is transacting business in this locality to commence his action in
a foreign jurisdiction on a cause of action
arising here, and transport his witnesses to
other states would make protection of his
right prohibitive and would, in effect, permit
nonresidents to continue in business in this
state immune from legal responsibilty. To require a nonresident to defend where he commits the alleged wrong is not an unreasonable imposition. (Emphasis added.)
The court summarized the rationale of its decision at page 316:
"While under the present law our legislature cannot deny a person a right to transact business in this state it can, pursuant to
its police power, license and regulate the business carried on. We are convinced under the
present day extensions of business into the
various states and the rapidity of commuting
interstate, that the narrow principles of the
early cases must be re-examined in the light
of modern conditions, and that this state to
properly protect its citizens must have a right
to siibject nonresidents, who maintain offices
and transact business herein, to be subject
to the jurisdiction of our courts if an agent
upon whom process can be served is still in
the employment of the nonresident and if the
cause of action arises out of the business
transacted here."
Plaintiff submits that under the facts of this
41
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case the law of Utah not only permits but requires
that a service of process upon the Secretary of State
be held valid. The ruling of the trial court must
be reversed.
POINT III
SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT BY PERSONAL
SERVICE UPON MR. MOONEY WAS VALID SINCE
THE FILING OF A MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF
SUMMONS DOES NOT IMPAIR THE RIGHT TO SERVE
ADDITIONAL SUMMONS UPON DEFENDANT.

The District Court held that service of summons upon Mr. Mooney was void since it was made
while defendant's motion to quash service upon Mr.
Manning was pending.
Reference to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
discloses no such restriction upon a plaintiff's right
to perfect service of process by issuance of two or
more separate summons upon defendant. Rule 4 (a)
provides as follows:
"The summons may be signed and issued by
the plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall
be deemed to have issued when placed in the
hands of a qualified person for the purpose
of service. Separate summonses may be issued
and served" (Emphasis added).
This rule must be "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action." (Rule 1). The District Court's
ruling herein, if upheld, would promote an opposite
result entirely. First, by the simple expedient of
filing a motion to quash, and escaping from the jurisdiction while such motion is pending, defendant
could prevent plaintiff from ever perfecting an incomplete or defective service. Secondly, even where
42
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the defendant remains amenable to further process,
unnecessary delay results from requiring plaintiff
to withhold further service until the motion to quash
is determined. Clearly, the District Court's ruling
if adopted would result in much unnecessary litigation. The parties should not be required to suffer
the expense and delay of litigating questions such
as are involved in Points 1 and 2 hereof, when such
litigation is rendered unnecessary by another service upon defendant.
There is no authority whatsoever for holding
that the filing of a motion to quash impairs the right
to issue further summons. Under Utah Rule 4 (a),
the summons is issued by plaintiff or his attorney,
and thus is not a writ of the court requiring judicial
action. In effect, the summons is a mere notice, informing defendant that a suit has been filed against
him. Defendant should not be permitted to raise
alleged defects in one such notice and meanwhile to
ignore further notice containing no such alleged defects.
A case directly on point is Lane v. Ball, 160
Pac. 144 (Ore. 1916), rev'd on other grounds
on rehearing, 163 Pac. 975 (1917). There, plaintiff served summons upon several defendants, who
moved to quash service on the ground that no copies
of the complaint were served therewith. While this
motion was pending, plaintiff served a second set
of summons upon these defendants. After defendant's' motion to quash the first set of summons was
granted, defendants moved to quash the second summons on the grounds that "the return of the first
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summons did not state that they were, or either of
them was, not found, and that when the second summons was issued there was pending in such court,
and undetermined, motions to quash the first summons and the service thereof" (160 Pac. at 146,
emphasis added).
After discussing matters not pertinent hereto,
the court concluded as follows:
"It remains to be seen Whether or not, after
the return of the original summons, showing
all the defendants to have been found by the
sheriff, the plaintiffs counsel could, without
leave of court, lawfully issue another summons . . . A summons issued by the plaintiff
or his attorney in an action instituted in a
court of record in Oregon is not 'process' within the meaning of that word as used in our
Code . . . Under the practice prevailing in
this state, a summons, not being process, is
nothing more than a mere notice to the defendant in a suit or action instituted in a
court of record, warning him that if he fail
to appear and answer the complaint within
the time limited judgment will be taken
against him for the sum demanded, or that
the plaintiff will apply to the court for the
relief prayed for in the initiatory pleading.
As a summons, whether served personally or
by publication pursuant to an order therefore,
is, in every instance, subscribed by the plaintiff or his attorney, the issuing of a second
or a subsequent summons is not an alias or
pluries writ, and hence need not contain the
clause 'as we have heretofore commanded9
you\ or, 'as we hive often commanded you ,
since such notice in a court of record is not
issued by the clerk.... Though the question is
not here involved, it is believed a plaintiff or
44
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his attorney, at the commencement of a suit
or action in a court of record, may, if necessary, issue as many summonses as he elects,
and thereafter file in court only the notices,
from the returns of which it appears that one
or more of the defendants has been served.
The course suggested would be advantageous
to a plaintiff when a defendant was attempting to flee the state so as to avoid the personal
service upon him of a summons and a certified copy of the complaint in a law action.
But hoivever this may be, the plaintiffs counsel herein ivhen he ascertained a mistake had
been made in failing to have copies of the
complaint served upon any of the defendants
execpt White, had the right, at any time before the statute of limitations had run against
his client's right, to issue another summons
and cause it and certified copies of the complaint to be served upon the parties as to
whom the prior attempted service was ineffectual." (160 Pac. at 148-150, emphasis
added).
Therefore, where the summons is issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney, rather than by the clerk
or the court itself, plaintiff has the right to serve
additional summons at any time prior to the expiration of the statutory period, whether or not a motion
to quash a prior summons is pending. A like result
was reached in Washington, under a similar statute
allowing service of summons by plaintiff or his attorney. In Roznik v. Becker, 122 Pac. 593, 595
(Wash. 1912), the court stated that:
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" . . . in this state a summons is in no sense
a writ of court. It is not even issued by the
court or the clerk thereof; but on the contrary, is issued by the plaintiff in the action
or by his attorney. The summons is in effect
a mere notice, and hence there is no reason
for holding that the issuance of one such notice in an action exhausts the power to issue
another. The essential requirement to obtain
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
is that he be served with a summons in the
form and in the manner prescribed by the
statute, not that he be served with any particular summons. The fact that the appellant
W€LS served with a summons other than the
one first issued does not therefore render the
service void." (Emphasis added).
Defendant cited the case of Farris v. Walter,
31 Pac. 231 (Ct. App. Colo. 1892) as contrary to
the above discussed rule. In Farris, plaintiff served
defendant with defective summons. Defendant moved to quash the service, and plairitif served defendant with a second summons which corrected the defect in the first. Defendant failed to respond to this
second service. The trial court improperly denied
the motion to quash the first summons and ialso
entered a default judgment against defendant for
failure to respond to the second summons.
The court of appeals reversed the default judgment on the ground that defendant's time within
which to respond to the second summons did not begin to run until the motion to quash had been deter46
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mined. It should be emphasized that the court did
not hold that the issuance of the second summons
was improper in any way. The court merely held
that defendant did not have to respond to this summons "while his motion to quash was pending", and
that defendant should have been "entitled to time
to answer or demur to the complaint, or to take such
other action as he deemed proper, before default
and final judgment should have been entered." (31
Pac. at 232). Therefore, the court in fact recognized the validity of the second summons, holding in
effect that but for the trial court's improper entry
of default, defendant would have been required to
respond to the second summons.
The Farris case in no way conflicts with the
rules of law later established in Lane v. Ball, supra,
and in Roznik v. Becker, supra, that where summons
is issued by plaintiff or his (attorney, further summons may be issued despite the pendency of a motion to quash former summons. In view of the injustice, delay and expense which would arise if a
contrary procedure were adopted, plaintiff submits
that the foregoing rule should be followed herein
and that service of summons upon Mr. Mooney be
held valid.
CONCLUSION
We submit to this Honorable Court that the decision of the District Court is contrary to established legal principles and is not supported by the evidence herein. We respectfully ask the Court to re47
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verse the decision of the District Court and to reinstate the service of process upon the defendant
William L. Pereira & Associates, a corporation.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
EARL P. STATEN
604 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
THELEN, MARRIN, JOHNSON &
BRIDGES
111 Sutter Street
San Francisco, California
Of 'Counsel
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Appellants
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